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CHAPTER I 
INTRO DU CTI ON 
Literature Review 
Interpersonal perception, or the interpretation and evaluation of 
social and interactional cues, is a process that lies at the heart of 
human intercourse. As Cline (1964, p. 221) has put it, 11 The evalua-
tion and assessment of others by all men is such a consistent and on-
going process that it operates almost automatically at times, commonly 
at nonverbal and sometimes at almost unconscious levels. 11 Implied in 
Cline's statement is that interpersonal perception begins at a very 
early, pre-verbal stage of development, and is therefore an important 
part of personality development. Support for such a notion can be 
found in the work of a succession of influential personality theorists 
beginning with nee-Freudian Horney (1963), who emphasized the develop-
mental importance of early interpersonal relationships rather than the 
traditional Freudian instinct theory. Klein (1960) claimed that the 
roots of personality are to be found in the earliest mother-child inter-
actions. Fromm (1970), Erikson (1950), Sullivan (1964), and Murray 
(1938) were other neo-Freudians who expanded on this trend toward view-
ing personality development as a function of interpersonal experiences. 
Such non-analytic theorists as Mead (1934), Allport (1960), and Leary 
(1957) followed a parallel course. 
1 
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Sullivan was the first personality theorist to place the self con-
cept at the core of his theory. Since then, theorists as diverse as 
Laing (1966), Goffman (1959), and Rogers (1951, 1961) have similarly 
emphasized the self concept, which is thought to develop directly from 
the process of interpersonal perception. In explaining its origin, 
most theorists accept some variant of Cooley's (1922) "looking glass 
self. 11 Through imitation, role-taking, or an empathetic "feeling 
with" the other person (usually a "significant other"), we come to 
adopt others' views of ourselves as our own self view. If we perceive 
that others think badly of us, then we develop a poor self concept. 
If we perceive that others accept us only when we perform in certain 
ways, then guilt ensues when we fail to measure up. 
Such conceptions form the basis for many current approaches to-
ward understanding and treating psychopathology. Jourard (1964) noted 
that when a person is unaware of who, what, and how he is, he is out 
of touch with reality. More specifically, he stated, "Every maladjusted 
person is a person who has not made himself known to another human 
being and in consequence does not know himself'' (p. 32). He explained 
further that when we present distorted views of ourselves to others we 
receive feedback that is itself distorted, and thus develop self views 
that are distorted. Such denial of reality, or distorted perception, 
as Coleman (1964) has pointed out, is a means of defending the self from 
stress and does not allow the individual to recognize those cues neces-
sary for effective functioning and adjustment. Carson (1969) has con-
tended that individuals who grossly misinterpret information and feed-
back about themselves through the process of selective inattention or 
enhancement will be considered psychologically disordered by others 
and will experience severe limitations in the quality of their social 
interactions. Leary (1955, 1957) emphasized the importance of inter-
personal interaction in his early work and developed a system of psy-
chiatric diagnosis based in part on the degree of discrepancy between 
the patient's self views and views of him by others. In his 1968 re-
3 
view, Campbell stated, 11 A major aim of the T-group method is to increase 
skill and accuracy in interpersonal perceptions 11 (p. 91 ). It is a 
well documented fact that group psychotherapy is the treatment of 
choice in dealing with alcoholics (Hartocollis and Sheafer, 1968; 
Stein and Friedman, 1971). Concerning such treatment, O'Leary (1974, 
p. 145), who has done extensive research with alcoholics, wrote, 
A primary aim of group therapy with such individuals, par-
ticularly the more psychologically disturbed, is to decrease 
the degree of personal distortion with a resulting increase 
in the accuracy of self perception. It is through self-
disclosure, reciprocal feedback, and the consensual valida-
tion provided in the interactional context of the group that 
one comes to recognize his relative position along a given 
psychological dimension, and the potential for both personal 
and interpersonal problem solving is increased. 
There is scientific evidence to support the notion that distor-
tions in interpersonal perception are directly related to the presence 
of psychopathology. Spiegal (1970) investigated the accuracy of self-
other judgments of psychiatric patients along the dimension of 11 health-
sickness. 11 Psychiatric in-patients rated by staff members as relatively 
healthy rated themselves as slightly less healthy. Patients rated as 
sicker rated themselves as much more healthy. The degree of perceptual 
distortion was more marked in the more severely ill patients who at-
tempted to present a favorable self-image. Donovan {1976), working 
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with general psychiatric in-patients, and O'Leary (1974), working with 
hospita1ized alcoholics, found that the inability to perceive oneself 
accurately or to predict how others see oneself is related to the level 
of depression. In both studies, severely depressed patients were 
found to underestimate their depression level as rated by staff mem-
bers, fellow patients, and the Beck Depression Inventory. Slightly de-
pressed patients tended to overestimate their depression level. Paykel 
et al. (1973) found that depressed patients who overestimated or exag-
gerated the severity of their depression tended to be more neurotic, 
more hysterical, and less obsessive than patients who underestimated 
the severity level. 
The theoretical importance of interpersonal perception has gener-
ated a vast number of studies in the area. The most common questions 
asked have been (a) Are some people better at interpersonal perception 
than others? (b) What types of' people are best at interpersonal percep-
tion? and (c) Under what conditions is interpersonal perceptivity en-
hanced? Although some definitive answers are available to questions 
(a) and (c), attempts to answer (b) have produced a muddle of conflict-
ing results. 
The scientific approach to this problem area was first given im-
petus by Darwin's work (1872) on emotional expressions and their recog-
nition. After only occasional notable studies in the early 1900's, 
there developed by the mid-1950's a sizeable literature utilizing a 
myriad of experimental techniques. One of the most popular approaches 
to the study of interpersonal perception during this era is typified 
by Dymond's (1949, 1950) attempts to measure empathetic ability. She 
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devised a test made up of four parts, each containing six character 
traits. In the first part an individual was asked to rate himself, on 
a five point scale, on each of the six character traits. In the sec-
ond part he was asked to rate some other individual on the six traits. 
In the third part he was asked to rate the other individual as he be-
1-ieved the other would rate himself. In the fourth part he rated him-
self as he thought the other would rate him. Thus, an ingenious measure 
of a person 1 s empathetic ability could be derived from seeing how 
closely his predictions of another 1 s rating corresponded with the 
other 1 s actual ratings. Simple difference scores formed the basis of 
the analysis. In 1950, she used this test in a study concerning person-
ality type and interpersonal perceptivity. 
In 1955, Taft reviewed the literature, crediting Dymond for her 
11 landmark 11 1950 paper. Although he found no consistent pattern of re-
sults concerning personality type and accuracy of interpersonal percep-
tion, he concluded that the ability to judge people is a valid concept; 
that is, some people are better at it than others. He sounded a cau-
tion in interpreting such research, citing several studies, including 
Green (1948), which indicated that people tend to 11 assume similarity, 11 
or attribute to others the same response on these tests that they would 
make themselves. Taft warned that this artifact could have major im-
plications in interpreting future research. 
In the same year, 1955, Cronbach published an article which chal-
lenged the interpretation not only of Dymond's work, but virtually all 
the preceding studies in interpersonal perception. The typical accur-
acy scores to that time involved a 11 judge 11 who predicted another 
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person's responses on a Likert type rating scale. As in Dymond's test, 
simple difference scores between these yielded what were thought to be 
pure accuracy scores. Cronbach showed that these simple difference 
scores concealed hidden variables which depended heavily on unwanted 
components. 
Cronbach described the following components which apply when two 
or more subjects are rated on a single trait: (a) mean or level. If 
the mean of the judge's ratings deviates, either higher or lower, from 
the mean of the criterion scores, his difference score will be higher 
and his apparent accuracy lower. (b) spread. The ipread or variance 
of the judge's ratings may be large or small. Judges who tend to make 
extreme ratings of others will tend to make larger errors, which will, 
in turn, result in larger difference scores. If the variance is rela-
tively small the judge will get a much smaller difference score, assum-
ing his estimation of the mean is correct. (c) correlation. The 
judge's ratings may correlate with the criterion scores of not. He may 
have ranked the subjects in correct order concerning the particular 
trait or not, which will affect his difference score. 
In the case where the judge rates two or more subjects on a num-
ber of traits and a single, grand difference score is extracted, Cron-
bach described four components: (a) elevation. This is the differ-
ence between the grand mean of all ratings, for all subjects on all 
traits, and the grand mean of the criterion scores. (b) differential 
elevation. This term has spread and correlation terms, and reflects 
how closely a judge 1 s average predictions of another person's scores 
on all items correspond to the mean of that person's actual responses. 
(c) stereotype accuracy might be ca 11 ed the ability to predict how 
others in general rate themselves. It corresponds to the mean term 
in the analysis for one trait (but has correlation and spread terms, 
because there are a number of traits and a number of means). (d) 
differential accura__sy_ also has spread and correlation terms, and re-
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fl ects abi 1 ity to predict dHferences between others on any item. The 
component is averaged over items. This 11pure 11 accuracy score is 
achieved by remova 1 of the el eva ti on and stereotype ace uracy terms from 
the data, and the pooling of remaining factors. 
In addition to 11 Cronbach 1 s components," several response set arti-
facts came to be recognized by other researchers. Although a large 
n~mber of these have been identified, only the most prominent will be 
mentioned. Assumed similarity, mentioned above, makes it difficult in 
some cases to determine whether a judge 1 s correct predictions are ac-
curacy or assumed similarity. Edwards (1957) found high positive corre-
lations between social desirability of personality inventory items and 
the likelihood that subjects will rate the items as descriptive of 
themselves. It would follow that a subject 1 s assumed similarity score 
would be higher for people he regards favorably. Rogers (1959) found 
support for this notion when he controlled for favorability and found 
no relationship between real similarity and assumed sim"ilarity. Wolfe 
(1977) has complicated the interpretation by showing that if a judge is 
actually similar to the target on a particular trait, he will be able 
to more accurately perceive that trait in another person. 
Cline (1964) identified several potential sources of contamination 
of accuracy scores, with social desirability foremost. Social desira-
bility bias makes subjects reluctant to give certain answers, so a 
8 
particular item is answered the same way by most subjects. If the judge 
perceives this fact or if he reacts to social desirability set himself, 
he can accurately predict what most subjects will say. The halo effect 
has long been recognized as a response set in which judges tend to be 
less discriminating in their ratings on the various traits, and instead 
use some single impression to determine the pattern of trait ratings 
for a particular subject. Rommetveit (1960) found support for his hy-
pothesis that the dominant and easily discriminable irrelevant attri-
bute 11 breaks through 11 in attempts at judgments of the subjectively 
less important and less easily discriminable attribute. For instance, 
subjects who emphasize 11 good looks 11 as a basis fo·r choosing friends 
(dominant attribute) will allow that attribute to break through when 
trying to rate others on intelligence level. 
Cronbach's work had an immediate impact on interpersonal percep-
tion research, at first bringing it almost to a halt. Several workers 
in the field (Crow and Hammond, 1957; Cline and Richards, 1960; Bronfen-
brenner et al., 1958; Chance and Meaders, 1960; Sechrest and Jackson, 
1961) continued to publish articles, but others were apparently dis-
couraged. For example, in 1964 Vernon asked, 11 Might we not question 
whether the whole area has not been shown to be so complicated that it 
is hardly possible to interpret the true psychological significance of 
any experimental findings?" (p. 66). 
Despite this air of pessimism, various attempts have been made to 
avoid the problems created by 11 Cronbach 1 s components" and response set 
artifacts. Bronfenbrenner (1958) introduced a technique for controlling 
stereotype accuracy, by which each prediction was expressed as a devi-
ation from the mean of estimates made by the judge for all subjects on 
\ 
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that item. Christensen (1970) devised a similar technique using the 
judges' own admitted norms rather than the average of their actual 
predictions. Gage and Cronbach (1955) pointed out that it is quite 
possible that the stereotypes obtained by these two methods would not 
coincide, and they suggested studies which obtain both measures on the 
same judge. 
With respect to Cronbach's differential accuracy term, Bronfen-
brenner (.1958), Hatch (1962), Cline (1964), and Christensen (1970) have 
each devised elaborate procedures for calculating their own pure ac-
curacy terms. Each claims that their procedure yields a score which 
is superior to Cronbach's in accuracy. 
Cook and Smith (1974) utilized a group ranking technique to con-
trol for response set bias and Cronbach 1 s components. They used rank 
order correlations calculated for each subject, for each of four at-
tributes, between that subject'~ ranking of the group and the criterion 
ranking, derived from the Eyesenck Persona 1 i ty Inventory. Studies 
using correlations between judges' ratings on more traditional numeri-
cal scales and the criterion include Richards et al. (1962) and Gaben-
nesch and Hunt (1971). Another approach, which .. is employed in the 
present study, is to analyze the data in more sophisticated ways, sep-
arately identifying Cronbach's components. No examples of this ap-
proach could be found in the literature, although Cook and Smith (1974) 
suggested that if each trait is analyzed separately, simple standard 
scores can be used, eliminating the level and spread components. 
These studies in the ''post-Cronbach 11 era unanimously support the 
notion that accuracy of interpersonal perception is a valid concept. 
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For instance, Bronfenbrenner (1958) found that judges differ signifi-
cantly from one another in ability to predict others' self ratings, 
but had virtually no demonstrated ability to predict how others would 
rate them. In the succeeding years no researchers have reported evi-
dence to refute either of Bronfenbrenner's findings. Christensen 
(1974) found evidence for the generality of perceptual accuracy scores 
across persons and thei~ reliability over time. Cook and Smith (1974) 
used four traits--extraversion, neuroticism, authoritarianism, and in-
te1 l igence, and found that subjects could predict others accurately 
only on the extraversion-introversion dimension. 
Other research has sought to clarify the conditions under which 
interpersonal perceptivity is enhanced. Bronfenbrenner (1958) pro-
duced evidence for a complex interaction effect between the sexes in 
small groups. He found that when males and females fall into a com-
plementary relationship with respect to power roles (particularly when 
the males fail to assume a leadership role and the females assist in 
leading), greater accuracy in interpersonal perception results. How-
ever, conflict in power roles produces perceptual blind spots. Brewer 
and Brewer (1968) and Powell et al. (1976), utilizing different meth-
odologies, produced evidence to suggest that interpersonal perceptiv-
ity is enhanced when the judge and target are in direct reciprocal 
communication rather than viewing each other on videotapes, films, or 
other indirect means. Mehrabian and Reed (1968) summarized evidence 
that when a communicator receives feedback from his target, the target 
is able to more accurately translate the communicated message than 
when the coffmunication is attempted without interpersonal feedback. 
It is thought that the communicator learns from various forms of 
11 
feedback that his target is not accurately decoding his communication, 
in which case the communicator may then modify his communication un-
til accurate decoding is achieved. 
In a slightly different vein, Hayes (1972) found that the sheer 
amount of talk between the judge and target is directly related to ac-
curacy. Stryker (1962) found a direct relationship between frequency 
of contact and accuracy. Taft (1966) determined that acquaintanceship 
is an aid to accuracy. In an unusual finding from an early (pre-
Cronbach) study, Gage (1952) showed that under some circumstances 
judges do better predicting responses of people they have never seen 
than they do after actually seeing the others• behavior. This result 
was explained as being an example of stereotype accuracy, which is 
believed to be a skill independent from the ability to predict individ-
ual differences (Bronfenbrenner, 1958; Cline, 1964). 
The studies mentioned above form the backbone of attempts to study 
interpersonal perceptions within the limitations imposed by Cronbach's 
analysis. The complexity of this type of research. is illustrated by 
the fact that none of the authors claim to have achieved a perfect 
accuracy score (with all unwanted components eliminated) or to have de-
veloped a methodology that successfully controls for the many hidden 
artifacts. The inescapable conclusion is that there does not exist a 
fully satisfactory and validated test or procedure for measuring judg-
ing accuracy. 
Purpose of the Study 
Rogers (1951) suggested that psychopathology, in the form of high 
levels of tension and defensive behavior, is increased to the extent 
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to which a person perceives the incongruencies and discrepancies be-
tween his self concept and feedback about the way he functions in real 
social situations. The perception of such incongruous feedback is 
threatening and tends to be denied or distorted, and even more rigid 
and pathological behavior results. According to Rogers, if such a per-· 
son can 1 earn to disclose himself authentically in a warm, accepting, 
therapeutic atmosphere, the firm boundaries of the self-structure be-
gin to relax and the person begins to construct a new, more realistic 
configuration of the self. He will be more open to feedback from 
others, and better able to both sense and assimilate how others actu-
ally feel about him. As the person's internal tension is reduced his 
behavior becomes socially more sound and he is more capable of empathiz-
ing with others. 
It is this basic view of human behavior and psychotherapy which 
forms the rationale for the present study. The purpose of this study 
is to investigate interpersonal perception, including the ability to 
understand others and to correctly sense and assimilate feedback from 
others, and its relationship to the therapeutic quality of interaction 
in small groups. A unique methodology and system of data analysis was 
used in this regard. 
Background of Methodology 
The paradigm used in this experiment is based on work by Fromme 
et al. (1974). The content of small group interaction VJas altered in a 
more therapeutic direction through the use of differential reinforce-
ment of observable response classes. In choosing which response classes 
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to reinforce, they relied heavily upon Yalom (1970), who suggested that 
in order for group therapy to be a corrective experience, the group 
members must express their feelings toward the others in the group as 
these feelings arise (11 here and now"). Further, it is necessary that 
group members provide feedback and consensual validation for each other. 
~o that they can test the appropriateness of their behavior. Finally, 
Yalom stated that group members must attempt to understand each others' 
actions and feelings. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) amassed much support 
for the contention that interactions characterized by empathy, nonpos-
sessive warmth, and genuineness are the most significant factors related 
to client improvement in both individual and group psychotherapy. 
With these factors in mind, Fromme et al. sought to use the tech-
niques of verbal conditioning in a group setting to enhance the inter-
personal interaction process. Five observable classes of verbal 
responses were selected that could be easily and reliably judged. These 
included 11 here and now 11 expressions of feeling, giving and asking for 
feedback, and the use of two types of empathy statements representing 
two levels of empathetic involvement. Four person groups of college 
students were instructed to engage in interpersonal interaction using 
these five categories. These instructions were considerably detailed, 
and a summary of the response categories was listed on an index card 
in front of each subject as well. Whenever a subject said something 
that corresponded to one of the reinforceable categories his counter 
was advanced one digit. The counter made an audible click so the 
other group members could learn vicariously what was expected of them. 
The groups were given the same instructions and observed for the same 
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period of time. A tally was made during observation of the instruc-
tions-only control groups and compared with the data from the experi-
mental groups. 
Results over one session for each group indicated, as predicted, 
that the experimental groups with the feedback apparatus present did 
emit significantly more of the categorizable responses, an average of 
9.75 per person in a one hour session. In fact, the subjects in the 
control condition emitted scarcely any responses that would have been 
reinforceable, 0.85 per person. 
In a partial replication of this study, Fromme and Close (1974) 
found similar results adding a warm-up procedure to the instructions. 
Groups with the feedback apparatus averaged 10.04 responses per person; 
groups without feedback averaged 2.58. 
In the Fromme et al. study (1974), therapists were used to facili-
tate group discussion, and it was found that groups with a therapist 
produced over three times as many reinforceable responses as the groups 
without a therapist. Also, the therapist who made the fewest inter-
ventions was the most effective in facilitating the desired 11 here and 
now" interaction. This was consistent with work by Salzberg (1961), 
who found that the more a therapist verbalizes, the less the group mem-
bers verbally interact. Another result of the Fromme et al. study was 
that the number of reinforceable responses emitted by the group rrembers 
when both a therapist was present and reinforcement was used was ap-
proximately equal to the sum of the totals of such responses when ther-
apists and reinforcement were used separately. 
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The Present Study 
Phase I of the present study was a partial replication of the 
Fromme et al. (1974) study. Three distinct therapist modalities were 
utilized with and without reinforcement. The therapeutic effect of 
directive vs. role modeling group leaders has been debated in the lit-
erature by many authors, including Danskin and Robinson (1954), Porter 
(1943), and Gordon (1957). It was these two modes, plus a no-therapist 
condition, which made up the three levels of the independent variable, 
therapist modality. Following Phase I, in which group discussions with 
differing amounts of 11 here and now 11 content were induced as a function 
of differential reinforcement and therapist modality, Phase II con-
sisted of a post-test called the Group Perception Inventory (GPI), 
which was designed to measure the accuracy of interpersonal perceptions. 
Also, measures of group cohesion, self disclosure, and empathy were ad-
ministered. The accuracy scales derived from the GPI were analyzed 
with the independent variables in a maximum R2 procedure. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Phase I 
Subjects 
Thirty-six male and thirty-six female undergraduate volunteers at 
Oklahoma State University received extra course credit for participa-
tion in a 11 human relations" experiment. Assisting the two experiment-
ers were two female and one male third year graduate students in 
clinical psychology who each served as therapists for four different 
experi~ntal groups. 
Response Categories 
As in previous research using the 11 operant group 11 paradigm 
(Fromme et al., 1974), each of the 18 experimental groups was instructed 
to talk with each other for 50 minutes using certain categories of 
statements designed to keep them in the 11 here and now. 11 (See Appendix 
B for complete instructions.) The four categories were operationally 
defined as follows: (a) Feeling. Subject labels his own current af-
fective state produced by interaction with other group members. (b) 
Empathy. Any attempt, successful or not, to clarify the nature or 
source of another group member 1 s current affective state. (c) Behav-
ioral Observation. Subject tells another group member how he perceives 
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his current behavior or body language. (d) Seeking Feedback. Sub-
ject seeks information regarding his own current behavior. In the 
contextual sequence of interactions, only those statements that added 
new or additional information about ongoing processes or accompanying 
affective states were defined as scorable. 
Videotapes of two operant group sessions conducted during pilot 
work were used for a preliminary estimate of interjudge agreement con-
cerning the presence or absence of the categories. Verbatim trans-
cripts were first divided into 11 scoring units, 11 which were defined as 
any non-interrupted complete thought or statement. ·The few instances 
of disagreement between judges as to what constituted a scorabable 
unit were resolved in conference. The two judges scored 693 units. 
Of this total, 181 were determined reinforceable. This total was com-
pared with the record of statements actually reinforced by the experi-
menter. One hundred and seventy-five reinforcements were actually 
administered, of which five were later judged erroneous. The experi-
menter missed giving reinforcements in 15 cases for a ratio of 20 
errors in 693 judgments, or a 97% level of interjudge agreement. This 
compared with a 96% level of agreement in the Fromme et al., 1974 study. 
It should be noted that missed reinforcements have the effect of in-
troducing an intermittent schedule and are not considered particularly 
serious. 
Apparatus 
Each experimental group was seated with two subjects, male and 
female, on either side of a rectangular table, with the one-way mirror 
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of an observation room at one end of the table. Therapists sat at 
the end of the table opposite the mirror. Each experimental group's 
conversation was monitored by the experimenters via remote speakers. 
Subjects were infonned concerning these observations. A four channel 
relay control panel, with push buttons operating digital counters, 
was used to record those instances where the experimenter judged that 
a group member's statement fit one of the reinforceable categories. 
In the reinforcement conditions a digital counter placed in front 
of each subject was advanced together with the counters on the experi-
menter's control panel, producing a click which was audible to the sub-
jects. A red light attached to each subject's counter was used to 
provide two types of discriminative cues: (a) all four lights were 
automatically flashed on by an interval timer whenever three minutes 
elapsed with no reinforcements being given the group, and (b) each red 
light was individually switched on whenever any subject fell ten or 
more counts behind the subject with the highest count. Subjects were 
instructed that when all four lights flashed on they were to change the 
subject, since this was a signal that their conversation was not con-
ducive to improving interpersonal communications. They were also 
informed that when one light was switched on, that person needed as-
sistance in using the categories, or someone else was dominating the 
conversation. It was thought that this latter procedure, together with 
the counters, would enhance the subjects' motivation by encouraging a 
moderate amount of competitiveness. 
Instructions 
The instructions, which can be found in Appendix B, were designed 
19 
to clarify the task, explain the reinforcement apparatus for the groups 
which would be using it, and to maximize motivation. The basic set of 
instructions, which defined 11 here and now 11 communication, and the ac-
companying warmup procedure, were given to all groups. Those groups 
designated to receive reinforcement received an additional set of in-
structions explaining the use of the digital counters and red lights. 
Procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned in groups of 4 to 18 conditions, 
comprising three replications of six experimental conditions: in-
structions only, reinforcement plus instructions,' direct elicitation 
(DE) therapist plus instructions, DE therapist plus reinforcement 
plus instructions, role modeling (RM) therapist plus instructions, 
RM therapist plus reinforcement plus instructions. Each therapist was 
randomly assigned to four groups; one DE therapist plus instruction 
group, one DE therapist plus reinforcement plus instructions group, 
one RM therapist plus instructions group, and one RM therapist plus 
reinforcement plus instructions group. 
After being seated, the subjects in all conditions were given the 
instructions and warmup procedure (see Appendix B) suggesting the de-
sirability of improving interpersonal communi ca ti on. Each group met 
for one 50 minute session. At the end of each session, one of the ex-
perimenters entered the room, terminated the session, and introduced 
the post-tests (see Phase II section below). Initial instructions and 
termination of sessions was done by the same experimenter in each case. 
As mentioned above, subjects in the reinforcement conditions were 
given additional instructions concerning the reinforcement apparatus 
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(see Appendix B). Each reinforcement group received reinforcement on 
a continuous schedule. 
Therapists 
In both the DE therapist conditions and the RM conditions, the 
therapists intervened w·ith four categories of responses per session, 
eight responses in each category, for a total of 32 interventions per 
50 minute session. They were instructed to space the interventions 
evenly throughout the session. The therapists• interventions were 
limited because of the results in the Fromme et al. (1974) study, in 
which the therapist who was most successful in eliciting the desired 
responses intervened the fewest times, an average of 49 interventions 
per session. The therapists kept a record of the number and category 
of their interventions on a check sheet during the sessions (see Ap-
pendixes C and D). In the RM therapist conditions, the therapists 
intervened using the same four categories of responses that the sub-
jects were asked to use: (a) feeling, (b) empathy, (c) behavioral 
feedback, and (d) seeking feedback. In the DE therapist conditions, 
the therapists used the following four categories of interventions: 
(a) feeling request--the therapist requests a subject to describe what 
he is currently feeling. (b) empat~ reguest--the therapist requests 
a subject to identify what he thinks another group member is currently 
feeling. (c) behavioral observation reguest--the therapist requests a 
subject to describe his perception of another group member 1 s current 
behavior. (d) seeking feedback reguest--the therapist requests a sub-
ject to seek information concerning how some other group members per-
ceive his behavior in the group. 
Phase II 
Introduction 
At the end of the 50 minute session, each subject was asked to 
complete a 178 item questionnaire consisting of a 130 item Group Per-
ceptions Inventory (GPI) (Appendix H), a 10 item Elms Empathy Scale 
(Appendix F), a 30 item Jourard Self Disclosure Index (Appendix E), 
and a four item Group Cohesion Measure (Appendix G). 
Group Perceptions Inventory (GPI) 
On the GPI, subjects were asked to rate thems~lves and others 
in the group on each of 10 personality. traits: strong-weak, 
friendly-hostile, passive-active, good-bad, dominant-submissive, 
cold-warm, homely-attractive, open-closed, impulsive-cautious, and 
dull-intelligent. On each of these traits the subject was asked to 
rate on a five point Likert-type scale (a) how they saw themselves, 
(b) how they saw each of the other group members, (c) how they would 
predict how each of the other group members saw them, and (d) how 
they would predict how each of the other group members saw them-
selves. 
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In order to derive measures of interpersonal perception, various 
combinations of these raw scores were correlated and transformed ac-
cording to mathematical formulas. Fifteen interpersonal perception 
scales resulted, some of which parallel concepts found in the litera-
ture (empathy, stereotype accuracy, accuracy, assumed similarity, open-
ness), while the others appear to have potential utility (congruence, 
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stereotype empathy, personal openness, felt openness, perceived real-
ism, commonality, other acceptance, naivete, perceived naivete, and 
conformity). 
These scales were derived by transforming intercorrelations be-
tween various combinations of the raw scores into Z scores based on 
three formulas. First, the raw scores were classified as shown in 
Table I. 
TABLE I 
CLASSIFICATION OF GROUP PERCEPTIONS 
INVENTORY RAW SCORES 
Perception 
Metaperception 
(predicted other 
perception) 
My view of me 
~elf view (Si) 
My view of your 
view of me 
Self as Other sees 
me (SO~.) lJ 
My view of you 
Qther view (Oij) 
My view of your 
view of you 
Others 1 Self 
view (OSij) 
The four classifications of raw scores ares., o .. , SO .. , and 1 lJ lJ 
OS... The first subscript indicates who is making the rating or pre-lJ 
diction. The second subscript indicates who is being rated or whose 
score is being predicted. The subscripts j_ and j__ refer to the sub-
jects' seating position in the group. Raw scores were correlated and 
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transformed according to one of the following formulas, where X and Y 
are any two raw scores: 
f(X,Y) = j~i z(r(X,Y)) 
3 
(1) 
This f function (formula (1 )) yields a Z score based on the mean 
of correlations between an individual 1 s ratings or prediction of the 
other group members and ratings and predictions by each of the other 
three group members. For instance, if one wanted to determine the 
degree to which individual subjects can predict how the other individ-
uals in the group rate themselves, the X variable in formula (1) would 
be OS .. , which represents the individual predictions of other group lJ 
members' self ratings. The Y variable would be the other group mem-
bers' actual self ratings, Sj, and formula (1) then yields the Empathy 
Score (GPI scale 3). The following GPI scales were derived using 
formula (l) or the f function: 
1. Congruence (CG): degree to which one rates others as they 
are perceived rating oneself. 
CG • = f ( 0 •. , SO .. ) 1 lJ lJ 
2. Accuracy (A): degree to which one can predict how others 
rate oneself. 
A. = f (SO .. , 0 .. ) 
1 1J Jl 
3. Empathy (E): degree to which one can predict how others 
see themselves. 
E . = f (OS . . S . ) 
1 lJ, J 
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4. Perceived Realism (PR): degree to which others precict that 
one rates oneself as they would rate one. 
PR. = f ( 0 .. , OS .. ) 
, 1J Jl 
5. Commonality (CM): degree to which others rate themselves as 
similar to one. 
CM. = f(S., os .. ) 
, J Jl 
6. Other Acceptance (OA): degree to which one rates others as 
they rate themselves. 
OA . = f ( 0 ... , S . ) 
, lJ J 
7. Naivete (N): degree to which one rates others as they are 
perceived rating themselves. 
N . = f ( 0 .. , OS .. ) 
, lJ 1J 
8. Perceived Naivete (PN): degree to which others predict that 
one rates them as they rate themselves. 
PN. = f(so .. , s.) 
1 J 1 J 
9. Openness (0): degree to which others can predict ones' rat-
ing of them (reflects feedback). 
0. = f (so .. ' 0 .. ) 
, Jl , J 
The second formula yields a Z score which reflects the correlation 
between the means of any two types of raw scores. For instance, to 
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determine a subject 1 s generalized knowledge of how other group members 
rate themselves, one would compare the mean of the person's predictions 
of other group members' self views (OS. ·) lJ with the mean of those 
others' actua 1 views of themselves (Sj). In this case, X = OS .. lJ and 
y = sj in the following formula: 
g(X, Y) (2) 
The following GP! scales are computed using formula (2): 
10. Stereotype Accuracy (SA): degree to which the mean SO predic-
tion correlates with the mean of how others actually perceive one (cor-
related over the 10 different Likert items on the GPI). 
SA. = g (SO .. , 0 .. ) 
1 1 J J 1 
11. Stereotype Empathy (SE): degree to which the mean OS predic-
tion correlates with the mean of the others• actual ratings of them-
selves. 
SE . = g (OS .. , S . ) 
1 1 J J 
The h function, or third formula, yields a Z score based on the 
intercorrelation between the self rating and the mean of any other 
rating. For instance, if it is desired to find the degree to which 
the rest of the group as a whole is aware of an individual's self con-
cept, the mean OSji score (their average prediction of his self con-
cept) would be compared with that individual 1 s actual self rating, Si' 
yielding the Personal Openness Score on the GPI. The following GP! 
scales were computed using this formula: 
I x 
h(X, Y) = a(r(jfi, Y)) 
3 
12. Personal Openness (PO): degree to which others can predict 
one's self concept. 
PO. = h(Os .. , s.) 
1 J 1 1 
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13. Felt Openness (FO): degree to which one predicts that others 
agree with one's self perception. 
FQ. = h(SO .. , S.) 
1 lJ l 
14. Assumed Similarity AS): degree to which one rates oneself as 
similar to others. 
AS . = h ( 0 . . , S . ) 
1 lJ 1 
A separate formula is used to compute the last GPI scale, Con-
formity. 
15. Conformity (CF): degree to which one's judgment of others 
conforms to the group's judgment of those others. 
I 
CF. = jfi 1 
This formula represents the correlation between one person's rat-
ings of others in the group with ratings of those same others by the 
other group members. 
-----
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Hypotheses 
The measures of interpersonal perception most frequently mentioned 
in the literature correspond to GPI scales Accuracy and Empathy. Pre-
vious attempts to look at these variables have been bogged down by 
methodological problems and statistical procedures insufficient to con-
trol for the components identified by Cronbach. As was mentioned above, 
there has been no evidence reported that would indicate people are 
capable of accurately predicting what others think of them (Bronfen-
brenner, 1958). In the present study, it was predicted that Accuracy_ 
and Empathy would be significantly related to the number of reinforce-
able responses emitted in the groups. In addition, it was proposed to 
determine which GPI scales and other post-tests (Elms Empathy Scale, 
Jourard Self Disclosure Inventory, Group Cohesion Measures) were the 
best predictors, or accounted for the most variance in the number of 
reinforceable responses emitted per group. 
It was also proposed to determine which GPI scales and post-tests 
were influenced by the independent variables, reinforcement and thera-
pist modality. 
Finally, analyses of what components contribute to accuracy and 
empathy were conducted. With the advantage of having separate measures 
of the recognized components of accuracy and empathy, it was possible 
to find how much of the variance in each is accounted for by these 
components represented by the various GPI scales (i.e., stereotype ac-
curacy, assumed similarity, etc.). 
Data Analysis 
A maximum R2 stepwise regression procedure for the dependent 
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variable, number of reinforcements, and for the GPI scales accuracy and 
empathy, formed the basis of the analysis. The procedures were used to 
show how much of the variance in each of these variables was accounted 
for by the experimental design variables, the 15 GPI scales, the Jour-
ard self disclosure scale, the Elms empathy scale, and the group co-
hesion measures. 
In addition, using the 3x2 completely randomized design, ANOVAS 
were run for each of the scales of the GPI, the Elms, the Jourard, 
and the group cohesion measures. This determined the extent to which 
the independent variables influenced the various measures of inter-
personal perception. In order to compare the effectiveness of indi-
vidual therapists, ANOVAS were run on the same variables using a 2x2 
randomized block design with the no-therapist conditions deleted. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Phase I 
Phase I of this experiment was the basis of a separate study by 
the co-experimenter, George V. Dickey. A brief summary of the results 
of Phase I are shown in Table II and the results of the Fromme et al. 
1974 study are shown in Table III. Phase I was designed to determine 
the relationship between the design variables and the number of rein-
forceable responses emitted by the groups. 
RM 
DE 
NF 
TABLE II 
MEAN FREQUENCY OF REINFORCEABLE RESPONSES PER 
GROUP (FROMME, SCHAEFER, DICKEY, 
1980), PHASE I 
R NR 
16 13 14.5~th therapist 
17.5 
26 14.8 20.4 
without therapist 
9.8 2.2 6.0 6.0 
17.3 l 0. 0 
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TABLE II I 
MEAN FREQUENCY OF REINFORCEABLE RESPONSES PER 
SUBJECT PER GROUP (FROMME et al., 1974) 
Without reinforcement 
With reinforcement 
No Therapist 
.8 
9.8 
5.3 
Therapist 
12. 8 
23.3 
18. 1 
6.8 
16. 5 
As shown in Table II, the groups with a therapist present pro-
duced approximately three times as many reinforceable responses as 
the groups without a therapist. The groups utilizing the reinforce-
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ment paradigm produced almost twice as many reinforceable responses as 
the groups that did not use the paradigm. Both of the findings were 
similar to those obtained by Fromme et al. (1974). Overall, the di-
rect elicitation therapist groups produced 1.5 times as many reinforce-
able responses as the role modeling therapist groups, and the role 
modeling groups produced twice as many such responses as the no-
therapist groups. The direct elicitation and role modeling modes were 
approximately equally effective in the nonreinforced condition, but 
with reinforcement, the direct elicitation therapists were more con-
sistently effective in eliciting the desired responses. 
Phase II 
Analyses of Variance on GPI Scales 
Analyses of variance based on the 3x2 completely randomized 
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factorial design (Kirk, 1968) were performed on the 15 GPI scales, the 
mean of the four group cohesion measures, the Jourard sca1e, and the 
Elms Empathy scale. Of these, only four of the GPI scales, empa~, 
stereotype empathy, perceived naivete, and felt openness were signifi-
cantly affected by the design variables. 
The GPI scale empathy (E), as seen in Table IV, was not signifi-
cantly influenced by the type of therapeutic modality used, but the mean 
E score of 5.71 after reinforcement was significant1y greater than the 
mean of 5.56 obtained with no reinforcement (F = 4.35, df = 1 ,66, 
P < .05) (see Table V). A significant interaction effect was obtained 
(F = 3.78, df = 2,66, P < .05), and a test of simple main effects (Kirk, 
1968) revealed that only role modeling·therapists in combination with 
reinforcement produced significantly higher E scores {F = 5.53, df = 
1,66, P < .05), than when no reinforcement was administered. It is in-
teresting to note that while the direct elicitation therapists plus re-
inforcement condition resulted in more reinforceable responses, the 
role modeling therapists plus reinforcement condition resulted in sig-
nificantly more accuracy of interpersonal perception than role modeling 
therapists alone. 
Stereotype Empathy (SE), which correlated .82 with empathy, was 
similarly related to the design variables (see Appendix A, Table XVI 
for incorrelations of all GPI scales). As shown in Tables VI and VII, 
the mean SE score of 6.0 after reinforcement was significantly greater 
than the mean of 5.79 obtained when no reinforcement was administered 
(F = 5.46, df = k,66, P < .05). A significant interaction effect was 
found (F = 5.32, df = 2,66, P < .01) and an analysis of simple main 
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effects showed (as was the case with empathy) that only the role model-
ing therapist conditions interacted with the presence of reinforcement 
to produce significantly higher SE scores (F = 12.5, df = 1 ,66, P < .01) 
than when no reinforcement was administered. This suggests that the 
reinforcement procedure alone, and with the role modeling therapists, 
induced a quality of interaction which enabled the group members to get 
a better sense of how the others felt about themselves. 
TABLE IV 
TABLE OF MEANS FOR GPI SCALE EMPATHY 
TheraQt Mode 
DE RM NT 
Reinforcement R 5.62 5.82 5.69 5.71 
NR 5.70 5.44 5.55 5.56 
5.66 5.63 5.62 
TABLE V 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR GPI SCALE EMPATHY 
Source df MS F Value 
Therapy mode 2 .009 . 108 
Reinforcement 1 .373 4.35* 
Mode x reinforcement 2 .323 3.78* 
Residual 66 .086 
*P < .05 
TABLE VI 
TABLE OF MEANS FOR GPI SCALE STEREOTYPE EMPATHY 
Reinforcement R 
NR 
Source 
Therapy mode 
Reinforcement 
Theraey Mode 
DE RM 
5.83 6.19 
6.00 5.62 
5. 91 5.90 
TABLE VII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR GPI SCALE 
STEREOTYPE EMPATHY 
df MS 
2 .0087 
l .876 
Mode x reinforcement 2 .853 
Residual 66 . 160 
*P < • 05 
**P < . 01 
NT 
6. 01 
5.74 
5.88 
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6.01 
5.79 
F Value 
.05 
5.46* 
5.32** 
The scores on the GPI scale perceived naivete (PN), the degree to 
which others predict that one rates them as they rate themselves, were 
significantly related to therapeutic modality (F = 5.6, df = 2,66, 
P < .01), but showed only a trend toward significance with respect to 
presence of reinforcement (F = 2.94, df = l ,66, P < .09) (see Tables 
VII I and I X ) . 
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TABLE VIII 
TABLE OF MEANS FOR GPI SCALE PERCEIVED NAIVETE 
Theraey Mode 
DE RM NT 
Reinforcement R 6.41 6. 15 6. 13 6.23 
NR 6. 15 6. 31 5.84 
6.28 6.23 5.98 
TABLE IX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PERCEIVED NAIVETE 
Source df MS F Value 
Therapy _mode 2 .611 5.64* 
Reinforcement 1 . 317 2.94 
Mode x reinforcement 2 .382 3.54** 
Residual 66 
*P < . 01 
**P < .05 
The post hoc Newman-Keuls test (Kirk, 1968) was performed on all 
pairs of therapeutic modality means and it was found that the RM and 
DE modalities did not result in significantly different PN scores, but 
both were significantly different from the control, or no-therapist 
condition, with the DE at the P < .01 level and the RM at the P < .05 
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level. A significant interaction between therapy mode and the rein-
forcement was found (F = 3.54, df = 2,66, P < .05), and tests of simple 
main effects showed that only in the conditions with no therapists did 
the presence of reinforcement lead to significantly higher PN scores 
than with no reinforcement (F = 4.63, df = 1 ,66, P < .05). It 
also found that the three therapeutic modalities did not produce signif-
icantly different PN scores in groups where reinforcement was used, but 
in the case of no reinforcement, the means were significantly differ-
ent (F = 6.34, df = 2,66, P < .01). These means (DE - NR = 6.15, 
RM - NR = 6.30, NT - NR = 5.84) were analyzed by the Newman-Keuls pro-
cedure and the mean RM - NR score was significantly different from the 
NT - NR score at the P < .01 level and the DE - NR score was signifi-
cantly different from the NT - NR score at the P < .05 level. The RM 
and DE conditions, without reinforcement, did not result in signifi-
cantly different PN scores. These results suggest that both the rein-
forcement procedure and the therapists contributed to an atmosphere or 
type of interaction which resulted in the subjects feeling more accepted 
by each other. 
A scale which reflects the degree to which group members felt 
understood, felt openness (FO), was significantly affected by the pres-
ence of reinforcement (F = 4.53, df = l ,66, P < .05), with the mean FO 
score with reinforcement, 5.5 being greater than the mean 5.34 with-
out reinforcement (see Tables X and XI). While therapist mode had no 
significant main effect on FO scores, there was a significant interac-
tion (F = 5.8, df = 2,66, P < .01 ), which led to the finding that only 
the RM therapist modality resulted in significantly higher FO scores 
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with reinforcement than without (P < .01). Also, it was found that in 
the no-reinforcement conditions, the DE therapist modality resulted in 
significantly higher FO scores than the RM therapist conditions and 
the no-therapist (NT) conditions, P < .05. There was no difference be-
tween RM and NT conditions in this regard. 
TABLE X 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR GPI SCALE FELT OPENNESS 
TheraQJ'. Mode 
DE RM NT 
R 5.39 5.68 5.44 5.50 
Reinforcement NR 5.54 5.20 5.30 5.34 
5.46 5.44 5.37 
TABLE XI 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR GPI SCALE FELT OPENNESS 
Source df MS F Value 
Therapy mode 2 .060 . 581 
Reinforcement .466 4.527* 
Mode x reinforcement 2 .598 5.812** 
Residual 66 
*P < . 05 
**P < . 01 
Intercorrelations Among GPI Scales Signif-
icantly Related to Design Variables 
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The four GPI scales which were significantly related to the design 
variables, empathy, stereotype empathy, perceived naivete, and felt 
openness, were intercorrelated as shown in Table XII. 
TABLE XII 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF EMPATHY, STEREOTYPE EMPATHY, 
PERCEIVED NAIVETE, AND FELT OPENNESS 
QJ 
0. -0 
>, QJ 
>, ..µ >, > QJ 
..s:: o..i:: •r- ..µ 
..µ QJ ..µ Q) QJ 
rtl S- rtl u > 
0. QJ 0. S- •r-
E ..µ E (lJ rel 
w tl)UJ o..z 
Empathy 1. 00 .82 .26 
Stereotype Empathy 1.00 . 14 
Perceived Naivete 1.00 
Felt Openness 
Maximum R2 Stepwise Regression Procedures 
(/) 
(/) 
QJ 
s::: 
..µ s::: 
r- QJ 
QJ 0. 
u..o 
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.38 
.25 
1.00 
Maximum R2 stepwise regression procedures were run on three primary 
dependent variables: (a) number of reinforceable responses emitted by 
the groups, (b) GPI scale empathy, and (c) GPI scale accuracy. Because 
of the high correlations (reported above) between empathy and accuracy 
and their respective stereotype scores (stereotype empathy (SE) and 
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stereotype accuracy (SA)), only those procedures which excluded SE and 
SA will be reported. Each of these three regression procedures was 
designed to automatically include the independent variables therapist 
modality and reinforcement vs. no-reinforcement. Sex of the subject 
was also automatically included in each regression model. In order 
for the three levels of therapist modality to be analyzed by the binary 
(0, 1) computer capability, the three modalities were translated into 
two variables as follows: Mode Dl compared therapist effects (DE and 
RM) with no therapist effects. Mode D2 compared RM effects with DE 
and NT combined. Reinforcement (R) was assigned a value of 1 while 
no-reinforcement (NR) was designated 0 in the binary language. Males 
were designated 1 and females 0. 
Maximum R2 Stepwise Regression Procedure for 
Dependent Variable, Number of Reinforcements 
A maximum R2 stepwise regression procedure was used to determine 
which of the design variables, GPI scales, and other post-tests signif-
icantly contributed to the variance in the number of reinforceable re-
sponses emitted by the group. An eight variable model accounting for 
68.8% of the variance in the number of reinforceable responses emitted 
by the groups emerged as the best set of predictors in this analysis. 
Table XIII shows the analysis of variance table for this model. 
An inspection of Table XIII shows that the design variables were 
strong predictors of the number of reinforceable statements. Mode Dl, 
which compared therapist effects with no-therapist effects, was the 
most potent predictor, followed by reinforcement effects vs. no-
reinforcement. The fact that in both cases the direction of the 
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relationship was positive indicates that the presence of therapists 
and the presence of reinforcement were positively related to number of 
reinforceable responses at the P < .0001 level. 
Source 
Mode Dl 
Mode 02 
TABLE XI II 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR EIGHT VARIABLE 
STEPWISE REGRESSION MODEL., DEPENDENT VARI-
ABLE NUMBER OF REINFORCEMENTS 
df Partial SS F Value Prob. < F 
1 2374.20 77. 78 . 0001 
l 298.20 9. 77 .0030 
Reinforcement 1 930.59 30.49 .0001 
Sex l 64. 77 2.12 . 1465 
Commonality l 372. 53 12. 20 .0012 
Empathy 1 321 . 18 l 0. 52 .0023 
Other Vari-
ance 190. 94 6.26 . 0143 
Total 
Jourard 1 89.97 2.95 . 0871 
Std. B 
Values 
+. 72 
-.26 
. 41 
- . l 0 
.26 
-.24 
- . 18 
. 13 
The role modeling therapists' results, when compared with direct 
elicitation and no-therapist conditions, was not good. RM was a signif-
icant (P < .003) negative predictor of number of reinforceable responses, 
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when compared to DE plus NT. Sex was not significantly related to 
the dependent variable. Commonality emerged as the best predictor 
among GPI scales (P < .0012). This scale is strongly influenced by 
the subjects' tendency to assume similarity with each other. The fact 
that people tend to assume similarity with those whom they view fav-
orably (Rogers, 1959) suggests the possibility that people are more 
likely to use the response categories when they feel comfortable with 
and accepting toward those with whom they are interacting. Surprisinglj, 
Empathy was a significant negative predictor of the number of reinforce-
able responses (P < .002). This occurred even though the design vari-
bles were significantly associated with an increase in empathy scores 
and in reinforceable responses in the analysis of variance reported 
earlier. It may be that subjects who were most preoccupied with the re-
inforcement apparatus, therapists, and their own performance, and thus 
emitted the most reinforceable responses, were able to pay the least 
attention to others' subtle self expressions in the group. Another pos-
sible explanation of this incongruous result is that in the stepwise 
regression procedure, the variance in empathy accounted for by the de-
sign variables has been removed automatically, leaving what is probably 
the baseline level of empathetic ability the subjects had going into the 
experiment. It is possible that high empathy people simply are better 
listeners and tend to talk less than others. They may have found the 
task required in this experiment to be distasteful in some way, due to 
their sensitivity to others' discomfort. 
Other variance, which is similar to Cronbach's (1955) spread con-
cept, reflects the tendency of the variance or spread of the rater's 
scores to influence his accuracy. This result suggests that those whose 
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ratings vary significantly more than average are less likely to use the 
reinforceable categories. The total Jourard score was the final vari-
able in the model and had only a trend toward significance. It would 
be expected, however, that such a measure of self-disclosure would be 
positively related to the extent to which subjects use the four cate-
gories of responses. These categories require much more self-disclosure 
than is typically used in day to day conversation. 
Maximum R2 Stepwise Regression Procedure for 
Dependent Variable, Empathy with Stereotype 
Empathy Excluded 
A maximum R2 stepwise regression procedure was used to determine 
which of the design variables, other GPI scales, and post-tests were 
significantly contributed to the variance in the Empathy scores on the 
GPI. Because of the high correlation (.82) between empathy and stereo-
type empathy, the analysis excluded stereotype empathy (see Appendix I, 
Table XVII for the analysis with stereotype empathy included). A seven 
variable model accounting for 71.8% of the variance in Empathy emerged. 
In this model, summarized in Table XIV, other acceptance v1as the strong-
est single predictor of Empathy (P < .0001). Among the design variables, 
only the presence of reinforcement was positively related to empathy 
(P < .007), as was the GPI scale perceived similarity (P < .05). Other 
variance, or the variance in the ratings of others by individual raters 
in the groups, was negatively related to empathy (P < .05). 
The overwhelming dominance of other acceptance as a predictor of 
empathy was expected primarily because other acceptance encompasses 
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empathy in its operational definition. It is defined as the degree to 
which one rates others as they rate themselves. The two scales corre~ 
lated .797. Reinforcement and Assumed Similarity were the other vari-
ables which were significant, positively related, predictors of empathy. 
The fact that empathy scores had been significantly related to the 
presence of reinforcement in the analysis of variance for empathy re-
ported earlier, serves to solidify the notion that reinforcement is re-
lated to increased accuracy of interpersonal perception. 
Source 
Mode Dl 
Mode 02 
TABLE XIV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR SEVEN VARIABLE 
STEPWISE REGRESSION MODEL, DEPENDENT VARI-
ABLE EMPATHY, WITH STEREOTYPE 
EMPATHY EXCLUDED 
df Partial SS F Value Prob. < F 
1 .006 .203 .66 
1 .001 . 358 .56 
Reinforcement l .229 7. 792 .007 
Sex 1 .002 .058 .805 
Other Accep-
tance 1 3.658 124.24 . 0001 
Other Variance 1 . 123 4. 180 .0425 
Assumed Sim-
ilarity 1 .119 4.043 .046 
Std. B 
Values 
.035 
-.047 
. 189 
- .017 
. 771 
- .144 
. 140 
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Assumed similarity is a measure of the degree to which one rates 
oneself as similar to others. This is a recognized response set which 
is thought to be a significant component of empathy scores. This re-
sult is consistent with such an interpretation. 
Maximum R2 Ste~ise Regression Procedure 
for Dependent Variable, Accuracy with 
Stereotype Accuracy Excluded 
A . R2 t . . d d d . maximum s epw1se regression proce ure was use to eterm1ne 
which of the design variables, GPI scales, and other post-tests were 
significantly related to accuracy_ scores on the GPI. Because of the 
high correlation (.94) between accuracy and stereotype accuracy, the 
latter was excluded from the analysis (see Appendix I, Table XVIII for 
analysis with stereotype accuracy included.) An eight variable model 
accounting for 48% of the variance in accuracy scores emerged as the 
best set of predictors. This model is summarized in Table XV. 
As Table XV indicates, the design variables and sex were not sig-
nificantly related to accuracy. Two GPI scales were strong predictors; 
however, these were Personal Openness and Perceived Reality. Personal 
Openness is a measure of the degree to which others can predict one's 
self concept. It reflects self disclosure. Thus, the more one engages 
in self disclosure, the more accurate he is in predicting what others 
think of him. Perceived Realism is a measure of how much self under-
standing others see in a person. As such, this scale would be expected 
to be a predictor of how accurate one is at predicting how others see 
him. Congruence and Communality \vere slightly less potent predictors of 
accuracy (P < .04). Congruence is the degree to which one rates others 
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as they are perceived rating onself. Apparently, those who rate others 
in this way tend to be better judges of how others actually rate them. 
Commonality, the degree to which others rate themselves as similar to 
one~ could be described as an indicator of overall group closeness or 
favorability. In groups where this type of mutual favorability exists,-· 
the ability to predict what others think of you apparently becomes pos-
sible, whereas in general it is a skill that very few possess. 
Source 
Mode Dl 
Mode 02 
TABLE XV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR EIGHT VARIABLE 
STEPWISE REGRESSION MODEL, DEPENDENT VARI-
ABLE ACCURACY, WITH STEREOTYPE 
ACCURACY EXCLUDED 
df Partial SS F Value Prob. < F 
l . 005 .075 .78 
1 . 056 .852 .64 
Reinforcement 1 .00004 .0006 . 98 
Sex 1 . 023 .343 .57 
Personal 
Openness . 316 20.05 . 0001 
Perceived 
Realism 1 .669 10. 19 .003 
Congruence 1 . 311 4.75 . 031 
Commonality l . 310 4.73 .032 
Std. B 
Values 
.029 
- • 103 
.002 
.005 
.468 
. 365 
.221 
-.250 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of this study was to determine if a relationship 
existed between accuracy of interpersonal perception and the type or 
quality of interpersonal communication upon which it was based. The 
study was at least partially successful in demonstra.ting such a rela-
tionship. Phase I was successful in inducing different quantities of 
therapeutic 11 here and now 11 type responses in small groups through the 
differential use of the design variables, reinforcement and therapist 
modality. Both the design variables and the number of reinforceable 
responses emitted by the groups were significantly related to subsequent 
measures of interpersonal perception on the Group Perceptions Inven-
tory (GPI). Subjects' scores on three GPI scales which appear to mea-
sure very important attributes (empathy, stereotype empathy, and felt 
openness) were significantly higher following reinforcement than when 
no reinforcement was administered. A fourth GPI scale, perceived 
naivete, was influenced almost as much by the presence of reinforce-
ment. The fact that these scales, which measure such important attri-
butes as the degree to which group members can predict how others feel 
about themselves, and the degree to which group members feel understood 
and accepted, were significantly influenced by the reinforcement para-
digm suggests that the procedure produced qualitative as well as quanti-
tative changes in small group interaction. 
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The two therapist modalities, DE and RM, appeared to have a para.., 
doxical effect on the dependent variables. While the task-oriented DE 
therapists induced significantly more reinforceable responses in their 
groups, particularly with reinforcement, the RM therapists seemed to 
create a quality of interaction which was conducive to better interper-
sonal perception. The DE therapists remained more aloof from the group, 
giving out directives, while the RM therapist was disclosing his own 
feelings, giving feedback to others and leading by the example of his 
own personal involvement. The groups with DE therapists seemed to 
start quickly and peak early in their use of reinforceable statements, 
followed by a relative decline in such statements later in the session. 
The RM-led groups seemed to gain momentum more slowly and peak toward 
the end of the session. It is possible that the DE therapists caused 
the reinforcement to lose its value, perhaps because the subjects ex-
perienced relatively less autonomy in the learning situation. In terms 
of scores on the four GPI scales mentioned above, the RM plus reinforce-
ment condition seemed to be a particularly potent combination, leading 
to significant simple main effects on three of the four scales. This 
suggests the possibility that the RM style of therapy would be prefer-
able over repeated sessions where momentum would continue to build, 
group closeness, feelings of acceptance and understanding would increase, 
and accuracy of interpersonal perception would be relatively enhanced. 
A combination of DE and RM styles, with DE being used early in the 
initial session followed by RM, would possibly be effective. This com-
bination would not be effective if reinforcement is devalued by the 
DE modality. Further research in this area is indicated. 
47 
It was predicted that GPI scales accuracy and empathy would be 
significantly related to the number of reinforcements. Through the 
use of the maximum R2 stepwise regression procedure, it was found that 
accuracy was not related to the dependent variable. This result was 
consistent with the findings of Bronfenbrenner (1958), who found that 
s_ubjects were unable to predict what others thought of them. Surpris-
ingly, empathy was significantly negatively related to the number of 
reinforceable responses, even though the analysis of variance showed 
it to be positively related to the design variables. The number of 
reinforceable responses emitted was also significantly related to the 
design variables. One explanation of this surprising finding is that 
people who emitted the most desired responses may have been so preoc-
cupied with the reinforcement apparatus, therapists, and their own per-
formances that they were able to pay only minimal attention to others' 
subtle self presentations. Another possible explanation of this is 
that in the regression procedure for number of reinforcements, the var-
iance in empathy accounted for by the design variables was automatically 
removed, leaving a baseline empathy level. As mentioned above, this 
baseline appears to represent the capacity for empathy that subjects 
had coming into the experiment. Thus, high baseline empathy subjects 
did not use the desired categories as much as low empathy subjects. 
This may have occurred because high empathy people tend to be better 
listeners and tend to talk less. Also, the high empathy people may 
have been less susceptible to the experimental manipulations or less 
compliant as a group. At any rate, this result was unexpected and is 
difficult to understand intuitively. Further research is needed to 
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clarify the rel at ions hip betwc•i.=n the number of rei nforceab 1 e statements 
!lnd empathy. It is clear th~H. this relationship is much more complex 
than originally thought. 
As expected following thP results in Phase I, the design variables 
were significant predictors of the number of reinforcements. It also 
appears that the response cat~gories are more likely to be used in 
groups where members look favorably upon one another and where they 
feel comfortable and accepted (GPI scale Commonality). This scale is 
closely related to a tendency to assume similarity and it appears that 
peer modeling is enhanced in ~roups which tend to lobk upon each other 
favorably. Cronbach' s _sprea~_ term was represented in the analysis by 
the measure of Other Variance. which showed the subjects' tendency to 
make extreme judgments about others. In this case, those who tended to 
make extreme judgments also uJed the desired response categories less 
than others. 
This study was also desi9ned to determine the components of em-
pathy and accuracy. In terms of the variables available for study, the 
results for empathy are consi~tent with the findings of other re-
searchers. Again, one of Cronbach's components, spread or Other Vari-
ance, was a significant predic,;tor of Empathy. Assumed Similarity, a 
recognized response set artif~ct which has long been recognized as a 
component of judging accuracy, also showed a strong trend toward 
significance. 
Other Acceptance was the :,trongest predictor of Empathy, but the 
two scales correlated .80 and •lppeared to be measuring yery similar 
abilities. Other acceptance is the degree to which one rates others as 
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they rate themselves, while Empathy is the degree to which one can 
predict how others see themselves. To the extent that people rate 
others the same way they think others rate themselves, this may repre-
sent yet another response set artifact. Other acceptance may not be 
a valid component of Empathy; rather, it may be the result of an arti-
fact. The same is probably true of assumed similarity. Both empathy 
and assumed similarity utilize Oij term in their formula and differ in 
that Empathy uses Sj while Assumed Similarity uses Si. To the extent 
that subjects are similar in their self ratings, empathy and assumed 
similarity will be artifactually related to each other. 
The result of this analysis is that the components of empathy re-
main somewhat a mystery. Support was found for Cronbach's contention 
that the variance in ratings will affect empathy scores and the affect 
of response set artifact assumed similarity was seen. 
The analysis of accuracy, a type of interpersonal perception which 
has been deemed crucial for mental health by a variety of authors (see 
literature review), suggested that the design variables were not signifi-
cant predictors of the ability to determine what others think of you. 
The four GPI scales which emerged as predictors of accuracy appear to 
be related both because of the actual attributes they measure and be-
cause of artifactual dependencies between them. Personal Openness, 
which was the most significant predictor of accuracy, reflects how well 
others can predict one's self concept, and, as such, the scale reflects 
self disclosure. According to Rogers (1951 ), those who are high in self 
disclosure tend to be the least neurotic or rigid in their general be-
havior and perceptual capabilities. These people do not tend to distort 
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feedback from others and are thus better able to predict how others 
feel about them. Also, it is obvious that the more a person reveals 
about himself, the easier it is for others to accurately describe him. 
Compared with others, a person with high self disclosure will prob-
ably tend to have more congruence between his self presentation as 
perceived by others and his self concept. Thus, he will likely be more 
accurate in predicting how others see him because of a relatively bet-
ter feel for how he comes across to others. Perceived Realism reflects 
the degree to which others see self understanding in a person, and it 
is self evident why a person with high self understanding would be able 
to predict how others feel about him. These two scales, Personal Open-
ness and Perceived Realism, are significant, positive predictors of ac-
curacy, and appear to point to significant attributes of a high accuracy 
person. People who engage in higher levels of self disclosure and who 
have more self understanding are more likely to have an accurate idea 
of what others think of them. Two other GPI scales were significant 
predictors of accuracy scores; Congruence was positively related while 
Commonality was negatively related. Congruence, the degree to which one 
rates others as they are perceived rating oneself, is closely related 
to assumed similarity, with a .72 correlation between them. Also, as-
sumed similarity, while not significantly related to accuracy scores, 
shows a strong negative trend in that direction (P < .18). Thus,. it 
could be interpreted that congruence is actually that aspect of form 
of assumed similarity that applies to accuracy scores, while the more 
traditional definition of assumed similarity applies more to empathy 
scores. Commonality, which indicates the degree to which other group 
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members assume similarity with any particular subject, is signifi-
cantly negatively related to the accuracy scores of that particular 
subject. This suggests that those subjects who are good at predict-
ing what others think of them (accuracy) are sensitive to individual 
differences in interpersonal feedback and do not tend to assume that 
others will automatically rate them as similar to themselves regardless 
of how they really feel. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Through the differential application of reinforcement and varying 
therapist modalities, small groups were trained to interact using 
varying quantities of therapeutic "here and now" type responses. These 
independent variables, reinforcement and therapist modality, were found 
to significantly affect scores on a Group Perceptions Inventory, which 
measured many aspects of interpersonal perception. Measures of sub-
jects' ability to predict others' self concepts, group compatibility, 
closeness, and mutual feelings of understanding tended to be most posi-
tively related to the use of the reinforcement paradigm coupled with a 
role modeling therapist. Subjects who used the "here and now 11 response 
categories tended to be in therapist-led groups with reinforcement. 
They also tended to score high on measures of Self disclosure. Also, 
subjects in groups which used the categories more than others tended to 
assume similarity with each other more than other groups. 
Analysis of the components of accuracy and empathy, two important 
concepts in interpersonal perception, yielded somewhat muddled results. 
Empathy appeared to be affected·most by the subjects' tendency to make 
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extreme judgments about others (Cronbach's spread term) and by assumed 
similarity, a recognized response set artifact. As mentioned above, 
empathy was significantly related to the design variable reinforcement. 
Accuracy was most significantly related to the level of personal open-
ness or self disclosure in the subjects and the level of self under-
standing as rated by others. 
Future research in this area might address the questions of (a) 
the relative effectiveness of a combination of directive and role 
modeling therapist styles, (b) how to further refine to the GPI and 
subsequent system of analysis, and (c) how would oth~r populations of 
subjects, i.e., psychiatric patients or actual th~rapy group members, 
score on the GPI over time. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A 
REINFORCEABLE RESPONSES 
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1. Feeling: An expression of feeling. For example: 
11 I fee 1 nervous." 
"I am excited. 11 
"You made me angry. 11 
11 I 1 m glad you 1 re in the group. 11 
11 You 1 re attractive to me. 11 
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2. Em2athy: Clarify for another group member what you think he feels. 
For example: 
11 You 1 re feeling threatened. 11 
"You look nervous. 11 
"Are you bored? 11 
11 You 1 re feeling good. 11 
3. Behavioral Observations: Commenting on another group member 1 s body 
language or behavior. The comment must be made to that member. For 
example: 
4. 
"You seem to be avoiding eye contact with me. 11 
"You always smile when someone asks you a question. 11 
11 You haven 1 t said much in the group. 11 
"You seem to be acting very self-conscious. 11 
_Se_e_k_i_n~g_F_ee_d_b_a_c_k: Asking another group member 
havior, appearance, or how he feels about you. 
"Do I make you feel uncomfortab·I e? 11 
"Do you like me? 11 
"Do I seem angry to you? 11 
"What do you think of me?" 
to describe your be-
For example: 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONS 
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Instructions for All Groups 
The purpose of this experiment is to help you learn a method of 
communicating with each other on a personal basis, and to help us to 
better understand the nature of communication. This method involves 
sharing your feelings and observations about each other arising from 
the current situation, the 11 here and now 11 --here in this room and now 
during these 50 minutes that you are together. 
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In order to help you more clearly understand what we are looking 
for, we have devised four categories of statements which are helpful 
in promoting open personal communications. (At this time the experi-
menter points to the cards in front of each subject.) These are types 
of statements which have been shown to be effective in helping people 
get to know each other on a more personal basis, and we are asking you 
to use these categories with each other during the next 50 minutes. I 
will read them aloud and you can follow along with me. 
1. Feeling: This is any expression of your own feelings. Expressing 
feelings helps other people to know when to continue doing things 
you like and to discontinue doing things that annoy you. Some ex-
amples of feeling statements are: 
11 I fee 1 nervous. 11 
11 I am excited. 11 
"You made me angry. 11 
"I'm glad you're in the group." 
"You' re attractive to me. 11 
2. Empathy: This is clarifying for another group member what you think 
he feels; in other words, putting yourself in someone else's shoes. 
Giving someone else your empathy shows that you care enough to take 
the time to understand. Some examples of this are: 
11 It must be hard for you to say that. 11 
11 Are you feeling embarrassed? 11 
"You seem so happy. 11 
11 You must feel uncomfortable. 11 
11 You seem bored. 11 
3. Behavioral Observations: This is commenting on another group mem-
ber's body language or behavior. Pointing out observations about a 
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person's behavior clarifies for that person behaviors which he may 
or may not wish to continue. Examples of this are: 
11 You seem to be avoiding eye contact with me. 11 
11 You always smile when someone asks you a question. 11 
11 You haven't said much in the group. 11 
11 You seem to be acting very self-conscious. 11 
4. Seeking Feedback: This is asking another group member to describe 
your behavior, appearance, or how he feels about you. Many miscon-
ceptions between people could be avoided if they would check out 
what another person thinks or feels about them. Some examples of 
this type of question are: 
11 Do I make you feel uncomfortable? 11 
11 Do you like me? 11 
11 Do I seem angry to you? 11 
11 What do you think of me? 11 
The examples on the sheet in front of you are only a few samples of 
the kinds of statements that can be made in each category, and please 
don't limit yourself to these statements, but use them as a guide. It 
would be possible to say nearly anything just to fit the categories, 
or to limit yourself only to the examples, but this isn't what we wa~t. 
Each nevi statement should add new information. These categories become 
meaningful only when they are genuine, so really put yourself into this 
as much as possible. 
You can see that all these categories refer to the current situation: 
the interaction that will take place among you in this room. While you 
may have some very real feelings about other people or situations out~ 
side this group, this is not what we're looking for. Also, I realize 
it is impossible to use these categories at all times, but I hope you 
will use them as frequently as possible. 
What I am asking you to do is interact with each other using these 
categories as much as possible during the next 50 minutes. I will 
monitor the group through the one-way mirror and the microphone. What 
you say will not be recorded and will be kept confidential. 
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Instructions for Reinforced Groups 
Whenever someone makes a statement fitting any one of these cate-
gories, and is not merely a repeat of someone else's statement, I will 
activate the counter in front of that person. It makes a loud click 
which will let you know that you are in fact using these categories in 
your interaction. The counter registers your total and if anyone falls 
ten points behind the leader, the red light on his counter will be 
turned on. This will be a sign that either this person may need as-
sistance, or that someone is dominating the conversation. If no one 
gets a click for three minutes, all lights will flash on; and they will 
do so every three-minute period until a click is registered. This will 
be a sign that the group as a whole is not using the categories and 
that you should change the nature of your interaction. 
Finally, I realize that the apparatus makes for an artificial sit-
uation, but it's the least distracting, nondisruptive way we have found 
to give you information concerning your interactions while those inter-
actions are taking place. 
Warm-Up Procedure 
To make sure you understand these categories, I am going to give 
you a warm-up exercise. To get you used to communicating directly 
with each' other, I would like to two of you on this side of the table 
and the two of you over here to look into each other's eyes for ten 
seconds when I say 11 begin. 11 Ready, begin. 
(ten seconds elapses) 
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Now I'm going to ask each of you to use one of the response cate-
gories to see if you understand them. 
11 John, can you give a feeling response?" 11 ! was nervous when I 
was driving up here. 11 11 That 1 s a feeling but it is not in the here-and-
now. If you had said, 'I'm nervous,' you would have been correct." 
11 
______ , would you give an empatb.Y_ response to someone in 
the group?" 
II 
------
, would you give a behavioral observation to someone 
in the group?" 
II ' WOUld YOU Seek feedback from someone in the group?" 
Previous participants have found this experience enjoyable, but 
if you feel you must leave the group, please feel free to do so. We 
will stop at 
-------
APPENDIX C 
THERAPIST INTERVENTION GUIDE: RM 
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Fee 1 i ng I I I I I I I I J 
Empathy IlJ I I I I J I 
Behavioral 
Observation I I I I I I I I 
~~~~~~~k I I I I I I I I I 
I'm glad you're in the group. 
I like your 
I feel 
Embarrassed 
Threatened 
Anxious 
Good 
You feel 
It feels 
-----
I am 
Happy 
Excited 
Proud 
Nervous 
You are 
Frightened 
Glad 
Depressed 
Confident 
---
You look 
---
You seem to feel 
Are you ? You're acting 
-- ---
Any feedback not concerning emotions. 
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J You seem to be __ 
Do you realize 
you're 
Avoiding eye contact 
Tired 
Aggressive 
-----
Emotion or behavior or appearance. 
Do I seem to you? 
-----
What do you think of me? 
How do I strike you? 
APPENDIX D 
THERAPIST INTERVENTION GUIDE: DE 
68 
Eliciting 
Fee 1 i n g t--t-1 I -+--II l-1--J -+-+I 1--+--J J 
EJ iciting 
Sympathy -, j __,__, ......__,, ---, --+-, -+---+! J
Elicitation 
What are you experiencing right now? 
Could you bring that into the present? 
How are you feeling now? 
Where are you now? 
Can you ~yourself in Jim 1 s shoes? 
How would you feel if the group pres-
sured you? --
What do you think Jane is experiencing? 
What 1 s Jim doing right now? 
of Be ha v - -,--,---c-----.,.-....,--~---c--: What i s Mary say i n g? 
ior~ l Obser- j I j I I I I I I 
vat1on How would you describe Joe 1 s body lan-
Elicitation 
of Request 
for Feed-
back 
guage? 
Could you ask Jane how you 1 re affect-
ing her? 
D I I l. I I I I Why don 1 t you ask Fred to tell you ~ . . . . . . . what he thinks of you? 
Would you ask Jane if she likes 
you? 
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APPENDIX E 
JOURARD SELF-DISCLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Mark the appropriate rating on youi~ card by filling in the appropriate 
number. 
Rating: 
0 would tell this group of people nothing about this aspect 
of me or would like or misrepresent myself. 
1 would talk in general terms about this item to this group. 
2 would talk in full and complete detail about this item to 
this group. 
1. What I think and feel about religion; my personal religious 
views. 
2. My views on the present government--the president, govern-
ment, policies, etc. 
3. My personal views on sexual morality--how I feel that I and 
others ought to behave in sexual matters. 
4. The things that I regard as desirable for a man to be--
what I look for in a man. 
5. My favorite reading matter. 
6. The style of house and the kinds of furnishings that I 
like best. 
7. The kind of party or social gathering that I like best, 
and the kind that would bore me, or that I wouldn't 
enjoy. 
8. My favorite ways of spending spare time, e.g., hunting, 
reading, cards, sports events, parties, dancing, etc. 
9. What I would appreciate most for a present. 
10. What I find to be the worst pressures and strains in 
my work. 
11. What I feel are my shortcomings and handicaps that pre-
vent me from getting further ahead in my work. 
12. What I feel are my special strong points and qualifica~ 
tions for my work. 
13. My ambitions and goals in my work. 
14. How I feel about the choice of career that I have made--
whether or not I'm satisfied with it. 
15. Whether or not I owe money; if so, how much. 
16. The aspects of my personality that I dislike, worry 
about, that I regard as a handicap to me. 
17. What feelings, if any, that I have trouble expressing 
or cont ro 11 ing. 
18. The facts of my present sex life--including knowledge of how 
I get sexual gratification; any problems that I might have; 
with whom I have relations, if anybody. 
19. Whether or not I feel that I am attractive to the opposite 
sex; my problems, if any, about getting favorable atten-
tion from the opposite sex. 
20. Things in the past or present that I feel ashamed and 
guilty about. 
21. The kinds of things that make me just furious. 
22. What it takes to get me feeling real depressed or blue. 
23. What it takes to get me real worried, anxious, and 
afraid. 
24. What it takes to hurt my feelings deeply. 
25. The kinds of things that make me especially proud of my-
self, elated, full of self-esteem or self-respect. 
26. My feelings about the appearance of my face--things I 
don't like, and things I might like about my face and 
head--eyes, nose, hair, teeth, etc. 
27. How I wish I looked: my ideals for overall appearance. 
28. Whether or not I now have any health problems--e.g., 
trouble with sleep, digestion, female complaints, 
heart condition, allergies, headaches, piles, etc. 
29. Whether or not I have any long-range worries or concerns 
about my health, e.g., cancer, ulcers, heart trouble. 
30. My feelings about my adequacy in sexual behavior--whether 
or not I feel able to perform adequately in sex rela-
tionships. 
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APPENDIX F 
ELM 1 S EMPATHY SCALE 
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Fill in the appropriate letter for each item. 
1. When I read an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would 
feel if the events in the story were happening to me. 
extremely moderately neutral moderately extremely 
true true false false 
A B c D E 
2. When I see strangers, I almost never try to imagine what they 
are thinking. 
A B C D E 
3. I like to imagine myself as being various different types of 
persons. 
A B c D E 
4. I usually feel that I know exactly what mood my friends are in, 
even when nothing is said in words. 
A B C D E 
5. I find it hard to imagine how a poor southern negro feels about 
what people. 
A B C D E 
6. It's hard for me to act as if I'm a different kind of person than 
I really am. 
A B C D E 
7. After acting in a play myself, or seeing a·play or movie, I have 
felt partly as though I were one of the characters. 
A B C D E 
8. When I disagree with a person, I do not try to feel in my own 
mind the reason why the person holds an opinion different from 
mine. 
A B D D E 
9. I often try to guess what people are thinking, before they tell 
me. 
A B c D E 
10. A person can't really know what is going on inside someone else's 
head. 
A B c D E 
APPENDIX G 
GROUP COHESION MEASURE 
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On the four five-point scales below rate the way you see the group. 
~ ~ 
~ ..-- ...- ~ 
...- (]) (]) ...-
(]) +-' ...- +-' (]) 
E ctS ctS co E 
(]) s... s... s... (]) 
s... (]) +-' CJ) s... 
+-' -0 ::::i -0 +-' 
x 0 CJ) 0 x 
(]) E c E QJ 
1. attractive A B c D E unattractive 
2. like to continue con- not like to continue 
tact with group A B c D E contact with group 
3. meaningful A B c D E not meaningful 
4. enjoyable A B c D E not enjoyable 
APPENDIX H 
GROUP PERCEPTIONS INVENTORY 
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On each of a number of areas, you are to make ratings describing: 
l) how you see yourself; 2) how you see each of the other group mem-
bers; 3) your prediction or guess about how each group member sees 
~; 4) your prediction or -9.!:!_ess about how each group member sees him/ 
herself. These last two tasks, predicting the other's ratings, can 
be rather difficult. They require you to put yourself in the other 
group members' shoes and imagine how you appear to them and how they 
see themselves. Please take your time and try your very best. This 
information can lead to a better understanding of how people come to 
know one another. 
Your task is to rate the degree to which one of two adjectives, 
opposite in meaning, is descriptive of the person or viewpoint being 
rated. E.g., a sample item might be: 
Very 
KIND: A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutral 
c 
Moderately 
D 
Very 
E :CRUEL 
You might see yourself as very kind and so should mark the 11 A11 column 
on the IBM card. You might see the person sitting in Chair 2 as mod-
erately cruel and mark the 11 011 column for the appropriate item. If 
you predict that the person in Chair 3 sees you neutral on this scale, 
mark the appropriate 11 C11 • All marks must be made with number 2 pencils 
and should be a single, dark line through the center of the 11 circle. 11 
You have been provided with a card, listing each group member's 
name and the number of the chair in which he/she was sitting. Please 
refer to this card so that you will know to whom each item refers. The 
items below describe the person for whom ratings or predictions are 
made only bY the chair number. Items which refer to your own chair num-
ber have been marked out and should be skipped. 
Please keep your answers confidential and discuss the test only 
with the experimenter .. Please do not mark on this booklet. Do you 
have any questions? 
Very Very 
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STRONG: A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutral 
c 
Moderately 
D E :WEAK 
l. How strong/weak do you see yourself? 
2. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair l? 
3. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair 2? 
4. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair 3? 
5. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair 4? 
6. How strong/weak does the person in Cha__:j_r_J_ see ~? 
7. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 2 see~? 
8. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 3 see ~? 
9. How strong/weak does the person in Chair ~see y__~? 
10. How strong/weak does the person in Chair l see him/herself? 
11. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
12. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
13. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very Very 
FRIENDLY: A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutral 
c 
Moderately D . E :HOSTILE 
---
14. How friendly/hostile do you see yourself? 
15. How friendly/hostile do you see the person in Chair l? 
16. How friendly/hostile do you see the person in Chair 2? 
17. How friendly/hostile do you see the person in Chair 3? 
18. How friendly/hostile do.you see the person in Chair 4? 
19. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair l see 19_!!? 
20. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 2 see ~? 
21. How 'friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 3 see~? 
22. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
23. How friendly/hostile does the person in ~_bair J_ see him/herself? 
24. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
25. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chai!:_~ see him/herself? 
26. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 4 see ~im/herself? 
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Very 
PASSIVE: 
Very 
A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutral 
c 
Moderately 
D E :ACTIVE 
27. How passive/active do you see yourself? 
28. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair l? 
29. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair 2? 
30. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair 3? 
31. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair 4? 
32. How passive/active does the person in Chair l see ~? 
33. How passive/active does the person in Chair 2 see ~? 
34. How passive/active does the person in Chair 3 see~? 
35. How passive/active does the person in Chair 4 see ~? 
36. How passive/active does the person in Chair l see him/herself? 
37. How passive/active does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
38. How passive/active does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
39. How passive/active does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very 
A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutral 
c 
Moderately 
D 
Very 
GOOD: E :BAD 
40. How good/bad do you see yourself? 
41. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair l? 
42. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair 2? 
43. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair 3? 
44. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair 4? 
45. How good/bad does the person in Chair l see ~? 
46. How good/bad does the person in Chair 2 see ~? 
47. How good/bad does the person in Chair 3 see ,}"OU? 
48. How good/bad does the person in Chair 4 see ~? 
49. How good/bad does the person in Chair l see him/herself? 
50. How good/bad does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
51. How·good/bad does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
52. How good/bad does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very Moderately 
B 
Neutra 1 
c 
Moderately 
D 
Very 
DOMINANT: A E :SUBMISSIVE 
53. How dominant/submissive do you see yourself? 
54. How dominant/submissive do you see the person in Chair l? 
55. How dominant/submissive do you see the person in Chair 2? 
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56. How dominant/submissive do you see the person in Chair 3? 
57. How dominant/submissive do you see the person in Chair 4? 
58. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair see YQ..!:!_? 
59. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 2 see~? 
60. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 3 see~? 
61. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 4 see~? 
62. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
6-3. How dominant/submissive 
64. How dominant/submissive 
65. How dominant/submissive 
Very 
COLD: A 
Moderately 
B 
does the 
does the 
does the 
Neutral 
c 
person in Chair 
person in Chair 
person in Chair 
Moderately 
D 
66. How cold/warm do you see yourself? 
67. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair l? 
68. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair 2? 
69. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair 3? 
70. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair 4? 
71. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 1 see~? 
72. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 2 see ~? 
73. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 3 see YQ_~? 
74. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 4 see Y2.!:!.? 
2 see him/herself? 
3 see him/herself? 
4 see him/herself? 
Very 
E :WARM 
75. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
76. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
77. How cold/warm does the person in Chai'C_l_ see him/herself? 
78. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very 
IMPULSIVE: A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutral 
c 
Moderately 
D 
79. How impulsive/cautious do you see yourself? 
Very 
E :CAUTIOUS 
80. How·impulsive/cautious do you see the person in Chair l? 
81. How impulsive/cautious do you see the person in ChaiI_1_? 
82. How impulsive/cautious do you see the person in Chair 3? 
83. How impulsive/cautious do you see the person in Chair 4? 
84. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Cha..i!:_J_ see Y.Q..L!_? 
85. How impu·lsive/cautious does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
86. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 3 see~? 
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87. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 4 see y_~? 
88. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
89. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
90. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
91. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very 
DULL: A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutra 1 
c 
Moderately 
D 
92. How dull/intelligent do you see yourself? 
Very 
E : INTELLIGENT 
93. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 1? 
94. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 2? 
95. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 3? 
96. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 4? 
97. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 1 see~? 
98. How dull/intelligent does the person in Ch~ir 2 see~? 
99. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 3 see~? 
100. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 4 see~? 
101. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
102. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
103. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
104. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very 
HOMELY: A 
Moderately 
B 
Neutral 
c 
Moderately 
D 
105. How homely/attractive do you see yourself? 
Very 
E :ATTRACTIVE 
106. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair l? 
107. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair 2? 
108. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair 3? 
109. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair 4? 
110. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair l see you? 
111. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 2 see~? 
112. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 3 see l'.2.!:!_? 
113. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 4 see~? 
114. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
115. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
116. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
117. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
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Very Moderately Neutral Moderately Very 
OPEN: A B c D E : CLOSED 
118. How open/closed do you see ,l'.Ourself? 
119. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 1 ? 
120. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 2? 
121. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 3? 
122. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 4? 
----
123. How open/closed does the person in Chair l see~? 
124. How open/closed does the person in Chair 2 see ~ti? 
125. How open/closed does the person in Chair 3_ see~? 
126. How open/closed does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
127. How open/closed does the person in Chair see ~im/herself? 
128. How open/closed does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
129. How open/closed does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
130. How open/closed does the person in Chair 4 see b_im/hersel f? 
APPENDIX I 
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TABLE XVI 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR GPI SCALES 
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Congruence 
.35 • 38 .04 .16 .28 .66 . 14 .30 .37 .41 .33 .38 .72 . 32 
Accuracy 
.28 . 38 .09 .23 .25 . 14 .25 . 95 .27 . 61 .34 .22 .24 
Empathy 
.06 .06 .80 .45 .26 . 72 .24 .82 .24 • 36 .25 .53 
Perceived Realism 
. 50 .05 -.12 .33 . 17 .35 .02 .31 .22 -.03 .02 
ColTlllonal ity 
-.04 -.11 . 33 .04 .16 .05 .23 .35 .15 -.15 
Other Acceptance 
.41 .21 .83 .21 .63 . 15 .24 .07 . 61 
Naivete 
.11 .38 .25 .46 .28 .27 .56 .47 
Perceived Naivete 
.37 .13 .40 .18 .25 . 10 .27 
Openness 
.23 .56 .28 .38 .14 .58 
Stereotype Accuracy 
.29 .64 .38 .26 • 19 
Stereotype Empathy 
.24 .38 .29 .45 
Personal Openness 
.66 .35 .17 
Felt Openness 
.43 .17 
Assumed Similarity 
.23 
-----
TABLE XVII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR EIGHT VARIABLE STEP-
WISE REGRESSION MODEL, DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
EMPATHY, WITH STEREOTYPE 
EMPATHY INCLUDED 
Source df Partial SS F Values Prob.> F 
Mode Dl 1 .0044 .253 .62 
Mode D2 1 .0017 .099 .75 
Reinforcement 1 . 025 1.46 .23 
Sex 1 .00006 . 004 .949 
Stereotype Empathy . 925 53.08 . 0001 
Other Acceptance 1 .537 30.78 . 0001 
SO Variance 1 .174 10.0 .003 
Perceived Naivete l .0715 4.0 .044 
TABLE XVIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR FIVE VARIABLE STEP-
WISE REGRESSION MODEL, DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
ACCURACY, WITH STEREOTYPE ACCURACY 
INCLUDED 
Source df Partial SS F Value Prob.> F 
Mode Dl 1 .00003 .002 .957 
Mode D2 1 . 0117 .962 .669 
Reinforcement l . 0111 . 915 .656 
Sex .00004 .003 .9509 
Stereotype Accuracy 6.9593 572.145 . 0001 
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Std. B 
Values 
. 031 
-.019 
-.066 
-.003 
.503 
. 401 
- .172 
.118 
Std. B 
Values 
.002 
.044 
.037 
.002 
.955 
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